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BUSINESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM IN THE ROBERTS COURT

Vikram David Amar*
In this essay,1 I briefly explore Roberts Court cases in
two areas where business law intersects with my primary
field of scholarship, the United States Constitution.
Specifically, I examine the extent to which the two newest
Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, have
seemed unwilling to embrace the stances articulated by the
two Justices most often associated with the interpretive
philosophy of originalism, Justices Thomas and Scalia. My
examination takes place in the context of the limits the
Constitution has been held to place on punitive damages and
on state commercial regulation that runs afoul of the so-called
"dormant Commerce Clause" idea. I then discuss a few
reasons why, at least in the dormant Commerce Clause
setting but perhaps more generally as well,2 the strong form
of constitutional originalism embraced by Justice Thomasand to a slightly lesser degree, Justice Scalia-might not be
entirely appealing to the newcomers.

*Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of
California, Davis, School of Law.
1. This piece is a modified version of remarks given at the Santa Clara
Law Review Symposium entitled "Big Business and the Roberts Court:
Explaining the Court's Receptiveness to Business Interests," held at Santa
Clara University on January 23, 2009.
I thank the organizers of the
Symposium for their hard work, and my fellow Symposium participants for
their input into my thinking.
2. Let me be clear that I think originalism, properly understood and
consistently applied, is an important component of legitimate constitutional
interpretative methodology, notwithstanding my substantial disagreement with
the way Justices Thomas and Scalia seem to have understood and implemented
the originalism idea in various settings.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES

I begin with punitive damages and the Philip Morris
USA v. Williams decision handed down by the Roberts Court
in early 2007.1 The ruling invalidated as unconstitutional a
$79.5 million punitive damage award by an Oregon jury
against tobacco titan Philip Morris on the ground that the
jury instruction given by the trial judge violated the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
Specifically, the Court held the damage award was improper
because the instruction permitted the jury to punish Philip
Morris for harm it may have inflicted on persons other than
the plaintiff, and such punishment is impermissible. 4 The
majority opinion did go on to explain that it is legitimate for
the jury to consider harm done to non-plaintiffs in
determining how "reprehensible" a defendant's conduct wasa permissible factor to take into account when deciding how
large a punitive award should be.5
To be sure, the line the majority draws here-between
considering something to punish and considering it as part of
the reprehensibility assessment-seems fine. As Justice
Stevens says in dissent, "[tihis nuance eludes me."6 One
would reasonably fear that the distinction will elude any jury
that is directed to take into account harm to non-parties when
deciding the appropriate level of a punitive award, but that is
admonished not to punish the defendant for inflicting such
harm.
In addition to being fuzzy, the majority's test seems less
than completely coherent. Justice Breyer's opinion for the
Court criticizes what the Oregon courts had allowed because
there is no way to know "how many such [non-plaintiff]
victims [there] are," and because the jury cannot know "[h]ow
seriously [such non-parties] were injured," or "[ulnder what
circumstances [the] injury occur[red]."'

All of that may be

3. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
4. Id. at 353 ("In our view, the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a
State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it
inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that
it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.").
5. Id. at 355 ("Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that
the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to
the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible ...
6. Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 354 (majority opinion).
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true. But these things would appear equally true-and
seemingly equally unfair to the defendant-when we allow
the jury to consider these nonparty potential victims for
purposes of "reprehensibility" rather than for purposes of
direct "punishment."
For purposes of this essay, what bears attention is not
simply the correctness vel non of the ruling, but the lineup
that it generated and the roster of dissenters. In Philip
Morris, Justices Breyer and Souter-two of the more "liberal"
members of the Court (Justice Souter, in many respects,
being the most liberal)-are both in the majority (with Justice
Breyer authoring the majority opinion), along with Justice
Kennedy and the (seemingly quite conservative) Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito. Among the members of the
majority, Justices Souter and Breyer would not be expected to
favor, as a political matter, big business over personal injury
fraud victims.
The dissenters-Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg-are also odd bedfellows. Like the vote of (retired)
Justice O'Connor in Gonzales v. Raich (where she would
have allowed California to permit medical marijuana free
from federal governmental interference, notwithstanding her
stated personal belief that California's experiment was bad
policy),9 the vote lineup in Philip Morris is a good reminder
that Justices sometimes appear to overcome their personal
predilections when they perform the task of giving meaning
to the Constitution.
And a concern for methodological consistency in
constitutional interpretation is what likely explains Justice
Scalia's and Justice Thomas's decisions in a number of recent
punitive damage rulings to dissent. Although one might
predict that "conservative" Justices like Scalia and Thomas
might want to confine jury awards against big business, these
jurists object to the very idea of expanding substantive due
process doctrine to include new things. Why? Because a
fundamental objection to newfangled substantive due process
is the very crux of their argument against, among other cases,
Roe v. Wade ° and Lawrence v. Texas," the landmark
8.
9.
10.
11.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
See id. at 57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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substantive due process cases involving abortion and
consensual adult same-sex intimacy.
Since Justices Scalia and Thomas reject substantive due
process in those "privacy" cases on the ground that in 1868
(when the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was
enacted), states were free to regulate abortion and
homosexual activity, states must also be free, these Justices
say, to authorize punitive damages free from substantive due
process limits, since states were unconstrained in 1868 with
regard to such punitive remedies.
If the very idea of
substantive due process is unjustified and "made up" by
jurists in the privacy context, then these two Justices don't
want to be accused of hypocrisy in votes in the punitive
damages setting. And indeed, both Justices have called the
entire doctrine in this area "insusceptible of principled
application" 2 and have invoked the thoroughly discredited
Lochner v. New York" line of cases in order to demonstrate
how improperly they think the Court has been acting in this
area by essentially legislating limits and formulae for
damages.'4
In Philip Morris, Justice Thomas's dissent made clear
that he did not buy the majority's characterization of the case
as involving a "procedural due process" issue, calling the
majority's label and approach here "simply a confusing
implementation of the substantive due process regime this
Court has created for punitive damages."15
Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
both of whose views on substantive due process in the
abortion and same-sex-conduct settings will likely be
important for decades to come, felt comfortable in applying at
least a variant of the substantive due process concept to
strike down the jury award in Philip Morris. Perhaps Justice
Breyer's (not quite convincing, to me at least) 6 use of the
12. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined
by Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470-71
(1993) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring).
15. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 361 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
16. Certainly, the Court's ruling that Oregon simply cannot punish
defendants for wrongs done to non-plaintiffs certainly could be thought of as a
substantive barrier to a punitive objective Oregon wants to accomplish. To see
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adjective "procedural" in his majority opinion allowed these
two newcomers to sleep a little easier after joining the
opinion. But if the procedural/substantive dichotomy was
doing any of the work for either of these two new Justices,
then they certainly could have written separately to make
that clear rather than simply joining Justice Breyer's
majority opinion.17 Instead, the two newcomers seem not to
embrace the same aversion that Justices Scalia and Thomas
have repeatedly voiced concerning legislation-like rules
forged by judges to regulate punitive damages.
Crucially, even Justices Scalia and Thomas have
made clear that their aversion to judge-made, nuanced,
policy-driven, cost-benefit-balancing rules is limited to
constitutionally derived doctrine. In the other of the two
most significant punitive damages cases handed down by the
Roberts Court thus far, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,i"
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined a part of the Court's
opinion that limited damages in federal maritime to a
presumptive one-to-one ratio between the punitive and

that, ask yourself what additional procedures, if implemented, would enable
Oregon to punish for harm to others in this context. What those "procedures"
might be is far from obvious.
Justice Breyer himself also has some methodological explaining to do.
While he has not rejected, but rather has embraced, substantive due process in
the sexual privacy setting-and thus does not face the same quandary the more
conservative jurists confront-he has written recently in his book, ACTIVE
LIBERTY, that the Court should regularly defer to democratic majorities and
that Justices should be "restrained" in their exercise of judicial review. What
Judge/Professor Michael McConnell has written about Justice Breyer's
approach to interpretation in a different context (so-called "partial birth
abortion") applies to the PhilipMorris case as well: "Active liberty-the right of
the people [of Oregon] to deliberate and enact [and implement] legislationplayed no evident role in the decision." See Michael W. McConnell, Active
Liberty: A ProgressiveAlternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2387, 2401-02 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)).
17. Of course, it is always adventurous to infer much from what a Justice
decides not to write. But the reports of oral argument in the Philip Morris case
when it came back to the Supreme Court in the 2008 Term also suggests that
Chief Justice Roberts, at least, has no qualms about imposing absolute
substantive limits on state punitive damages in the name of the Constitution.
See Anthony J. Sebok, The Unusual Story of Williams v. Philip Morris, and
Its Third Trip to the Supreme Court-IncludingSome Predictionsabout What
the
Court
Will
Do
This
Time,
WRIT,
Dec.
16,
2008,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20081216.html.
18. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
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To deflect any charge of
compensatory components. 19
inconsistency, Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence, joined by
Justice Thomas, driving home the distinction between
constitutional and common-law judicial functions: "I join the
opinion of the Court, including the portions that refer to
constitutional limits that prior opinions have imposed upon
punitive damages. While I agree with the argumentation
based upon those prior holdings, I continue to believe the
holdings were in error."20
Does such a distinction between constitutional and
common-law roles make sense here? The Exxon majority
opinion (which, again, was joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas) succinctly explains why it does: "maritime
law ... falls within a federal court's jurisdiction to decide in a
manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of
Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial
result."2
This important power of Congress to fix judicial mistakes
is adequate to distinguish the legitimacy of policy-based
judicial balancing in the constitutional setting from the
common-law setting, but, as will be discussed below, this
important distinction is one that Justices Thomas and Scalia
do not seem to fully appreciate in the dormant Commerce
Clause setting.
II. DORMANT COMMERCE
The Roberts Court has handed down two noteworthy
dormant Commerce Clause rulings in the past two Terms.
Both cases involve the extent to which state or local
government can favor state government entities and
activities-rather than private in-state entities and
activities-over out-of-area entities and activities without
running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause ban on
protectionism. In United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Management Authority,2 2 county regulations in
New York required that all solid wastes and recyclables
generated within Oneida and Herkimer counties (located
19. Id. at 2632-33.
20. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 2619 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
22. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
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upstate) be delivered to one of several waste processing
facilities owned by the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority, a municipal corporation.
An out-of-state waste processer challenged these
regulations,
arguing
that
the
county
ordinances
impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce by
requiring garbage delivery to an in-state facility-thus
necessarily prohibiting the use of facilities outside the state,
and thereby diminishing the interstate trade in waste
disposal services.
Arguably, an earlier Supreme Court precedent was
directly on point. A decade and a half ago, in C & A Carbone
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,2 3 the Court invalidated a
seemingly similar so-called "flow control" town ordinance
because it had "require[d] all solid waste to be processed at a
designated [privately-owned] transfer station before leaving
the municipality."24 The Court in Carbone reasoned that the
ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce and
was invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
because it "depriv[ed] competitors, including out-of-state
firms, of access to a local market." 5
Despite the Carbone precedent, the United Haulers Court
upheld the local regulations, distinguishing Carbone on the
ground that the processing facility in United Haulers was
owned and operated by a municipal governmental entity,
rather than a private concern. According to the majority, the
dormant Commerce Clause's per se prohibition against
"hoard[ing] solid waste," as recognized in Carbone, is
inapplicable when the "preferred processing facility" is owned
by a public entity: "it does not make sense to regard laws
favoring local government and laws favoring private industry
with equal skepticism."26
There is a legitimate question whether the majority's
(limited) reading of Carbone is the best one. As the plaintiffs
in United Haulers pointed out, the processing station involved
in Carbone had many public attributes. The station was
privately built, but built pursuant to an agreement with a
town. Under the terms of the agreement, the facility was to
23.
24.
25.
26.

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 389.
United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343.
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be purchased by the town itself for the sum of one dollar after
five years. The town guaranteed that the facility would,
during the five years of private ownership, receive enough
waste and revenue to operate profitably by forcing all waste
generators to use the facility and by authorizing the plant to
charge a "tipping" fee of eighty-one dollars per ton, a rate
higher than the going market rate.27 As the Supreme Court
in Carbone noted, "[t]he object of this arrangement was to
amortize the cost of the station: [t]he town would finance its
new facility with the income generated by the tipping fees."28
This quasi-public character of the plant in Carbone was
thus quite apparent from the facts and the record in the case.
Indeed, Justice Souter's dissenting opinion (joined by the odd
combination of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Blackmun) highlighted the facility's public dimension as
grounds for arguing that the law requiring the facility's use
should be upheld. According to Justice Souter's dissent, there
was no unconstitutional favoritism because "the one
proprietor... favored [by the flow ordinance] is essentially an
agent of the municipal government."29 Since the ordinance
did not result in "the sort of entrepreneurial favoritism we
have previously defined and condemned,"3° the dissenters

concluded, the case should have come out the other way.
And yet, this line of reasoning did not move the majority
in Carbone to change its mind, or even to respond to the
dissent's reasoning directly. There is thus some argument to
be made that the public/private distinction, raised at least
somewhat by the facts and opinions in Carbone, was
implicitly rejected by the majority there.
But it is also apparent from the facts and record that the
facility in Carbone was, as a technical matter, privately
owned and operated for private profit for at least five years.
Moreover, the majority there never explicitly rejected the
dissenters' suggestion that publicly owned facilities should
fare differently under dormant Commerce Clause principles
than privately owned ones. Rather than such a rejection,
27. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386-87.
28. Id. at 387.
29. Id. at 416 (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
30. Id. Entrepreneurial favoritism is favoritism of one private business over
another.
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there was conspicuous silence: the majority (consistent with
the opinion style of Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the Court
in Carbone) simply never engaged the dissent in pointcounterpoint style, back-and-forth. 1
Assuming Carbone was not a constraint, was the United
On one hand,
Haulers majority's analysis convincing?
perhaps favoring the counties' cause, there are cases in which
dormant Commerce Clause principles have been held not to
apply when the favoritism of local interests results from a
state or city acting as a "market participant"-that is, a buyer
or seller of goods or services.
In one ruling, for example, the "market participant
exception" to the dormant Commerce Clause idea allowed a
city to choose to hire for public works only contractors that
used a workforce comprised of at least fifty percent residents
of the city. 2 In another case, the Court allowed a cement
company owned by the State of South Dakota to charge less
to in-state purchasers and more to out-of-state customers.3 3
In these and other rulings,3 4 the Court has held that where
the state or city in question is a "market participant," rather
than a market regulator, public favoritism of local businesses
or citizens is constitutionally permitted.
There are arguments, on the other hand, that the market
participant exception analogy might not be fully applicable in
True, the government-the Waste
United Haulers.
Management Authority-is acting as a market participant in
United Haulers by offering waste disposal services for sale.
But the government in United Haulers-unlike in the
paradigm market participant exception cases mentioned
above-is also acting as a regulator, requiring private
consumers to use only the designated waste treatment
Thus, it is hard to argue that the market
facilities.
participant idea applies with full force.
If the market participant exception reasoning fails, are
there other reasons to exempt publicly-owned facilities from
the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause idea? Perhaps.
31. See id. at 420.
32. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
33. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
34. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); cf.
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465
U.S. 208 (1984).
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First off, because there are only certain, narrowly limited
spheres in which the government owns and operates facilities
that compete with the private sector, the potential for
excessive protectionism and market disruption arising from
protection of such facilities is limited. In other words, if we
exempt public facility favoritism from the dormant Commerce
Clause ban, we need not slide down a slippery slope of
allowing all kinds of other local favoritism that drives up
costs and disserves consumers across the national economic
board.
Second, suppose, as some have argued,35 the dormant
Commerce Clause ban on local protectionism is less about
ensuring unfettered national market operations, and more
about promoting national political unity and identity. If so,
then favoritism benefiting local public institutions (as
opposed to private) may seem less constitutionally offensive.
On this logic, if a state or city treats its private citizens better
than out-of-staters, it really is sending a message of exclusion
and faction.
If it simply treats its own public entities
favorably to ensure their continued viability, the message
that is sent to the world about inclusion/exclusion seems
somewhat less offensive.
United Haulers was revisited and reaffirmed by the
Roberts Court the following Term in Department of Revenue
v. Davis." In rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to a
Kentucky regime that exempted from state income tax the
interest on government bonds issued by Kentucky or its
subdivisions, but that taxed interest income on bonds from
other states and their subdivisions, the Court found the
analysis of United Haulers completely on point:
It follows a fortiori from United Haulers that
Kentucky must prevail. In United Haulers, we explained
that a government function is not susceptible to standard
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely
motivation by legitimate objectives distinct from the
simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors ...
This logic applies with even greater force to laws favoring
a State's municipal bonds, given that the issuance of debt
securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially
35. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
36. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
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public function, with the venerable history we have
already sketched .... By issuing bonds, state and local
governments "sprea[d] the costs of public projects over
time," . . . much as one might buy a house with a loan
subject to monthly payments. Bonds place the cost of a
project on the citizens who benefit from it over the
years, .. . and they allow for public work beyond what
current revenues could support . . . .Bond proceeds are
thus the way to shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities
listed in United Haulers: protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens. It should go without saying that the
apprehension in United Haulers about "unprecedented...
interference" with a traditional government function is
just as warranted here, where the [Respondents] would
have us invalidate a century-old taxing practice . . .
presently employed by 41 States . . . and affirmatively
supported by all of them, see Brief for 49 States as Amici
Curiae.

Thus, United Haulers provides a firm basis
Just like the ordinances upheld there,
for reversal.
Kentucky's tax exemption favors a traditional government
function without any differential treatment favoring local
entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests.
This type of law does "not 'discriminate against interstate
commerce" for purposes of the dormant Commerce
Clause.' -3
As was true in the punitive damage realm, Justices
Thomas and Scalia have staked out their own close-toabsolutist position in dormant Commerce Clause cases,
rejecting the very idea of dormant Commerce Clause
limitations. They wrote separately in United Haulers and in
Davis to concur in the results, but they have made clear that
they think the Commerce Clause is no more than an
affirmative grant to Congress, and that the Constitution, by
its own terms, does not foreclose any state regulation of
state
protectionist
overtly
activity-even
commercial
regulation-unless it falls within the terms of some other
textual prohibition in the Constitution on state laws. 8 They
37. Id. at 1810-11 (citations omitted).
38. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 610-20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't
of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
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characterize the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as a
textual embarrassment and deny that it has any legitimate
historical grounding. As faithful originalists, they reject it at
its core.
Importantly, neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice
Alito seems to embrace the originalist position here, at least
as Scalia and/or Thomas articulate it. Chief Justice Roberts
wrote the United Haulers opinion and joined in the majority
opinion in Davis, both of which discuss, apply, and implicitly
affirm existing dormant Commerce Clause cases even as they
decline to extend such cases to instances of favoritism for
state-owned entities. There is no hint in either majority
opinion that the dormant Commerce Clause edifice should be
reexamined, or even that existing cases are being applied only
on account of stare decisis. In this regard, Chief Justice
Roberts may embrace or accept dormant Commerce Clause
thinking more than his predecessor and mentor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, did. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist may never
have expressed the absolutist view challenging the legitimacy
of all dormant Commerce Clause cases as do Justices Thomas
and Scalia, he did express a great deal of skepticism (and
sometimes sarcasm) about a doctrine that seemed so
atextual 9
Justice Alito seems even more ready to embrace dormant
Commerce Clause thinking. He dissented in both United
Haulers and Davis, and thus would have voted to invalidate,
on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, the laws at issue. He
authored the lengthy dissent in United Haulers, wherein his
reading of existing dormant Commerce Clause precedentincluding Carbone-was expansive and sophisticated. There
was not a hint of questioning the legitimacy of any of the
earlier cases, and there was no suggestion that stare decisis
alone was doing a major part of the work.4 ° He did write
dissenting in part).
39. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 689 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Casual readers of this Court's Commerce Clause
decisions may be surprised, upon turning to the Constitution itself, to discover
that the Clause in question simply provides [affirmative congressional power.]").
40. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 356-71 (2007) (Alito, J., joined by Stevens, J. & Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Alito's dissenting opinion was not very conservative in
other ways too.
For example, it dismisses the idea that "traditional
governmental functions"-an idea advanced by the "conservative" wing of the
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separately in Davis to make clear that his dissent there, and
in United Haulers, was based on the "assumption" that the
existing cases should be followed. 1 Justices Scalia and/or
Thomas seem to have "talked to" him in the intervening year;
there was no suggestion in the broad United Haulers dissent
of any such "assumption." Rather, he seemed to be reading
past cases for what they were worth because they made sense
to him.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH JUSTICE THOMAS'S ORIGINALISM
(IN THIS AREA)

There are, to my mind, some good reasons why Justice
Alito would be well-advised to continue to resist the
originalist position of Justice Thomas in the dormant
Commerce Clause setting. Justice Thomas's (and to a lesser
extent Justice Scalia's) originalism in that context suffers
from some major flaws, many of which recur in other
constitutional arenas in which Justice Thomas has staked out
the most far-reaching of originalist positions.42
First, Thomas's originalism in the dormant Commerce
Clause realm is one that completely disregards stare decisis.
At least Justice Scalia seems willing, on respect-forprecedent grounds, to continue to invalidate overtly
are
that
instances
and
laws
state
protectionist
indistinguishable from past cases even as he wants the Court
to get out of the business of judicially balancing in-state and
out-of-state interests. 3 Justice Thomas, who once seemed
willing to follow dormant Commerce Clause reasoning, and
then at least seemed for a time to share Justice Scalia's
grudging acceptance of stare decisis in this realm,44 more
go
recently has written by himself 5 to make clear he would
4 6 of
number"
"vast
the
notwithstanding
back to square one
Court in National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)-could ever be
defined with coherence.
41. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1830 (Alito, J., joined by Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
42. See generally Vikram David Amar, Morse, School Speech, and
Originalism,42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 637, 647-58 (2009).
43. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994)
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring).
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring).
46. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., joined by
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Supreme Court cases in the way---cases Justice Thomas does
not even acknowledge, let alone deal with. For example, in
United Haulers, he tries to counter a few of the cases relied
on by the majority, but he never grapples with all the cases
that even Justice Scalia realizes are on the books. Also,
Justice Thomas dismisses cases in his stare decisis discussion
in United Haulers by simply saying they lack support in the
Constitution, but that is not dealing with stare decisis at all;
that is simply reiterating the originalist approach.47
Second, and related, the zeal with which Justice Thomas
applies his originalism causes him to miss a hugely important
aspect of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Although
dormant Commerce Clause cases are decided in the name of
the Constitution, among constitutional rulings they are quite
unusual in that they can be remedied, if they turn out to be
mistaken, by simple congressional action. For example, if
Congress explicitly said it wanted to permit favoritism for
local publicly owned waste treatment facilities, then the
dormant Commerce Clause problem would dissolve. In this
regard, these cases are much more like statutory
interpretation cases than they are like other constitutional
rulings.
It may seem odd that Congress can make a constitutional
problem go away, since the Constitution binds even Congress.
But in the dormant Commerce Clause setting, what is
constitutionally problematic about local favoritism is that we
don't trust the local governments that engage in it. In
particular, we don't trust those local entities to fully take into
account the interests of people outside their jurisdictions.
But if such favoritism has the blessing of the Congress-a
national body that represents all the interests in the nationthen the skepticism about that favoritism largely disappears.
Because ultimately it would be up to Congress, then, to allow
or disallow local favoritism of the kind at issue in United
Haulers, perhaps the Court should ask itself: what do we
think Congress would do if it had time and space on its
legislative agenda to take up this issue?
If the Court viewed the question in this way, it would be

Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to the "vast number" of cases decided over the
last century plus).
47. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 350-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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acting a bit like an administrative agency, rather than a pure
court of constitutional law, in trying to anticipate what result
best accords with congressional values. Its role would also be
similar to the role the Court plays in interpreting federal
statutes, rather than the Constitution. As to statutes, the
Court recognizes that any errors it makes are ultimately up
to Congress to fix if it wants. Here, instead of interpreting
specific congressional text, the Court would be interpreting a
broader sense of expected congressional intent.
Relevant questions under this perspective would include:
What is this Congress's general attitude toward state and
local autonomy in general, and in the area of waste
management in particular? Are there federal statutes on the
books that touch on waste processing that reflect a
congressional attitude about the trustworthiness of local
governments in this realm? And so on, and so forth.
Indeed, it seems quite clear that some federal
instrumentality is needed to police state favoritism in the
commercial regulation realm, and that Congress is ill-suited
to the task because of the large number and context-specific
nature of local attempts to disadvantage out-of-staters. It
seems quite likely that if the Court were to say it was getting
out of the dormant Commerce Clause business because the
kind of constitutional balancing of interests it has been doing
is not appropriate for courts, Congress might very well
respond with a statute explicitly authorizing the Court to
keep doing what it has been doing."
In this regard, the
common-law maritime realm at issue in the Exxon punitive
damages case is very relevant to the dormant Commerce
Clause debate.
Indeed, and this brings us to a third and related point: if
we ask whether Congress is unhappy with the Court's work
in dormant commerce, there is no evidence to so suggest.
Congress has not in recent memory legislatively reversed a
judicial invalidation of a state law that was done on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds, and indeed seems to legislate
against and in reliance on a backdrop of federal judicial
vigilance here. Such reliance by Congress explains why stare
48. This
Restoration
exercise of
Resources v.

is precisely what Congress did in enacting the Religious Freedom
Act after the Court rejected constitutional balancing in the free
religion realm in Employment Division, Department of Human
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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decisis has traditionally been very forceful in statutory
interpretation cases.
Interestingly, even Justice Thomas
seems to accept a strong version of stare decisis in statutory
cases. 49
Justice Thomas simply seems so intent on
vindicating originalist-first principles that he fails to
recognize the nuance in the constitutional doctrine of
dormant commerce.
Fourth, Justice Thomas's originalism here, like
elsewhere, seems not to fully take account of the implications
that his other originalist positions would have. Justice
Thomas thinks the Commerce Clause does no more than
authorize Congress, that it does not invalidate state
protectionist regulation, and that it is up to Congress to deal
with such protectionism. Yet his reading of how broadly
Congress can act under the affirmative Commerce Clause
idea calls into question how easily Congress could police state
protectionism in the first place. In cases like Raich,5 ° Justice
Thomas's brand of originalism would seem to prevent
Congress from regulating local "production" or "manufacture"
matters.5 And yet, if a protectionist local law took the form
of regulating production (e.g., no entity may produce widgets
in town unless its owners reside in town), it is not clear how
Justice Thomas's understanding of congressional powers
would allow federal regulators to get at this parochial
regulation. Nor could Congress regulate the city government
who passed the law, under the so-called anti-commandeering
52
doctrine.
These inconsistencies are why Justice Thomas's
invocation of Lochner in the dormant Commerce Clause
realM5 3 (and remember that he and Justice Scalia invoke the
spectre of Lochner in the substantive due process punitive
damage realm as well) seems so unpersuasive.
One
overwhelming problem with the Lochner era was that the
Court was telling states they could not regulate workplace
excesses because of the "liberty of contract" and also telling
49. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 401-02 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("It is true that we give stronger stare decisis effect to our holdings
in statutory cases than in constitutional cases.")
50. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
51. See id. at 58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-62 (1992).
53. See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 354 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Congress that it could not intervene because it lacked
Commerce Clause power over local matters. That meant that
decisions would stay in the hands of employers and
employees, who arguably could not be trusted, because of
unequal bargaining power, to always do what was in the
public good.
In the dormant Commerce Clause realm, Justice Thomas
would seem to keep courts out (because the dormant
Commerce Clause idea has no grounding in the text or history
of the Constitution) and keep Congress out in at least some
cases (because Commerce power does not reach local
matters), leaving the decisions in the hands of state and local
governments, who (like employers
and employees)
presumably cannot be trusted-because of their particular
incentives and accountability-to do what is in the larger
public interest.
One can hope, at least, that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito will understand these potential problems with
originalism, at least in this setting, before joining Justice
Thomas's crusade.

